Posts Tagged ‘TOD’

Household Response to Incentive Payments for Load Shifting: A Japanese Time-of-Day Electricity Pricing Experiment

You need to log in to view this post

  • Added:Thursday, May 13th, 2010
  • Writer(s):Isamu Matsukawa, Hiroshi Asano, and Hitoshi Kakimoto
  • Publication Date:2000
  • Publisher:The Energy Journal
  • Abstract:We measure the effect of incentive payments of residential time-of-day (TOD) electricity demand in summer, using data from a residential TOD electricity pricing experiment in the Kyushu region of southern Japan. During the experiment, participating households could receive incentive payments if they reduce their peak usage share. Results based on an econometric model indicate that households have shifted their electricity usage from peak to off-peak periods in response to the incentive payment, but the effect of the incentive payment on load shifting was modest.
  • Tags:, , ,

Incentive Payments in Time-of-Day Electricity Pricing Experiments: The Arizona Experience

More about this report

  • Added:Wednesday, May 12th, 2010
  • Writer(s):Daniel H. Hill, Deborah A. Ott, Lester D. Taylor, and James M. Walker
  • Publication Date:February 1, 1983
  • Publisher:The MIT Press
  • Abstract:The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) required all electric utilities to implement time-of-day (TOD) pricing or else to "show cause" why TOD rates should not be implemented in their service areas. In order to comply with PURPA, electric utilities and public utility commissions have been searching for evidence pertaining to the costs and benefits of TOD pricing in the residential sector. Some of the most relevant evidence on this subject has been generated in the TOD Demonstration Projects sponsored by the former Federal Energy Administration (FEA). I The primary purpose of the present paper is to clarify the record with regard to the incentive payment that was implicit in the Arizona experiment during its first year. Previous studies of the Arizona data (Aigner and Hausman, 1980; Atkinson, 1977; Miedema et al., 1978; and Taylor, 1977) have either ignored this implicit payment or else not properly taken it into account. This has resulted in serious misrepresentations in both the magnitude and direction of the Arizona TOD responses. In the sections that follow, we shall describe in detail the implicit incentive scheme, indicate a way to take it into account, and provide some estimates of time-of-day price elasticities that are free of its confounding effects. While the focus is on the Arizona experiment, the problems analyzed are general and can arise in any field experiment in which incentive schemes play a role.
  • Tags:, , ,

Household Response to Optional Peak-Load Pricing of Electricity

You need to log in to view this post

  • Added:Wednesday, May 12th, 2010
  • Writer(s):Isamu Matsukawa
  • Publication Date:2001
  • Publisher:Kluwer Academic Publishers
  • Abstract:I investigate the impacts of voluntary time-of-day (TOD) rates on residential demand for electricity. My analysis is based on a sample of a survey, which provides cross-sectional data on electricity consumption and economic/demographic features for both TOD and non-TOD households in Japan. This information is used to develop an almost ideal demand system for the TOD electricity consumption during the summer. The results show that (1) household response to the high price of the peak period is relatively modest, and (2) the relative magnitudes of the price and selection effects depend on the ownership of water heaters.
  • Tags:, , , ,
« Older Entries